Introduction
When speaking of maps it is perfectly reasonable to distinguish between territory and space, because it is necessary to establish some difference between different ways of experiencing, remembering or thinking of places. Space, then, is a human production and therefore has historical and cultural connotations. Hence the importance of maps, specially those which seek to be validated before a court and/or in the corridors of power. A map is a document and also a monument, which means that to its value as a record we have to add a diplomatic function. Perhaps those who think that maps serve to show us the way to places are right: we, however, unashamedly disagree with this so-called practical utilitarianism. In any event, this article will ignore that commonplace of Whig historiography which seeks to see maps as a sort of driving force of movement or, in other words, to explain the progress of voyages or explorations by (or for) the existence of such representations of the seas or territories.
We are backing a different strategy: to emphasize that maps are a highly original and efficient form of managing time. Thus, paradoxically, geographers would be experts at translating spaces into time: how long a journey might take (roads), the traces of administrators (estates or towns), the memory of conflicts (borders), the existence of sponsors (the names of things) or the signs of progress (ports or mines).
The production of maps is not as uniform as we might think, and differing practices record the different ways of understanding what a country was and, mainly, what it aspired to be. Rather than showing what a territory is like, they show what the space that they create may become. The certainties, lies and folds that they contain and the corresponding management of time attain geopolitical rank or, in other words, serve a double purpose: on one hand they fix dividing lines and on the other they benefit their owner. For that reason in the eighteenth century the new technologies applied to space production (scientific expeditions, geodesic cartography, the algebra of populations and resources and the engineering of borders and forts) put maps in a delicate situation.
Livingstone has already pointed out the profound geographical transformation imposed by physicotheology 1 , and one only has to read the introduction to El Orinoco ilustrado (1741) of the Jesuit José Gumilla to understand how much transition (spiritual) and management (material) there is in geographical description and in a map. But we are referring to a kind of representations which are conceived as topographic repositories ordered within both the territorial and jurisdictional fields, and whose intention was to generate bonds of proximity and property, and thence of authority to participate in decision-making forums Thus, when in the eighteenth century it was decided to make a modern map of Southern America, there surfaced all the tensions associated with the task of creating a historical account from the remarkable diversity of sources available. The undertaking was all the more problematic because it came at a moment when there was an urgent need to transform maps into stable documents, without such a situation hindering operations aimed at the production of new spaces.
Attempting the Big Picture
In 1775 Minister of State Grimaldi received the results of the work that had been ordered ten years before from the geographer Juan de la Cruz Cano y Olmedilla (1734-1790): the engraving of a modern detailed map of Southern America. This map gave a uniform representation of a large part of everything that was known about an area of increasing political tension, historically mythical, rich in natural resources and unexplored in many of its regions. Cruz Cano, trained in Paris in the studio of D'Anville, had to copy and oversee the engraving of plates of the map drawn by Francisco Millau y Maravall (1728-1805), a sailor who had taken part in the expeditions emanating from the Treaty of Limits (1750) on the boundaries between the American territories of the Spanish and Portuguese empires. It was an easy task, but in 1766 Cruz Cano took the decision not to copy it and to create a new map based on all those available 5 .
Taking data coming from an extraordinary variety of sources he produced a rough draft of great dimensions that could only be managed laid flat on the ground, and on which he verified longitudes "with respect to all the nations which have established their meridians" 6 . This work would bear fruitful results. In 1769, for example, appeared the Spanish edition of the Viage del comandante Byron al rededor del mundo, translated and annotated by Casimiro Gómez Ortega (1740-1818), provided with a map by Cruz of the Magellan Strait, which consisted of a dialogue over two centuries between explorers, administrators and sailors, with sources ranging from the accounts of Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa (1555 Gamboa ( -1620 , to the latest map of Milhau (1768). Such a dialogue was possible because Cruz worked with four systems of reference for longitude, which included, as well as the Pico de Tenerife -still the most used-and the older one of Isla de Hierro, those of Paris and London, which were by then becoming dominant. A simple glance at the map shows the importance of the toponymic differences and the war of names maintained with the English. The result is a toponymic and topographic encyclopedia, a sort of museum which allowed the hoarding of geographical space, and created a guide to the management of immense flows of colonial information.
If we compare this map of the Strait of Magellan of 1769 with that of 1775 we immediately notice that the information it contains is as important as that which is eliminated. In the second, the longitudes refer in the first instance to the east of Teide, although the other references remain and, of course, the toponymy is unified to Spanish or, as the author explains, the old names are recovered. Also coastal measurements and defeats (naval information) disappear, announcing what was already known but was not yet visible: that the coasts were going to be managed independently from the continental masses. As well as recovering the original names . It is not that the sailors hated the bureaucracy, nor that they distrusted these landbound geographers. They rejected the disproportionate character of that style of producing documents, based on technologies that were neither mathematical nor mechanical, and whose usefulness they found hard to discern. They had been trained to produce and to read another type of maps, other forms of representing and codifying information. And their way of incorporating geographical information into the political universe was also different.
Cruz's attempt, rather than representing space, unites and accumulates it depending on its appearance in time or, better, history. Its purpose was not to show distances, but to fix the univocality of the colonial world, unifying visual codes so that the map could defend metropolitan sovereignty over a homogenous whole, with no instability nor differences. Cruz was not aware that local information could have with their courses properly corrected, a denser and more carefully-selected network of roads and, above all, broad spaces labeled "unknown land". The information was suppressed in order better to calibrate the territory and to suggest the direction in which new spaces could be created. Thus, the blanks were functional because they avoided improvisations or the design of unreliable strategies. The unknown territory, as long as it did not change its status, counted only as a possibility and never as a political object.
Hence in that interface of territory that we call a map, the silences served to represent areas without history or, in other words, places whose resources could not be mobilized and from which, as a consequence, no advantage could be obtained. . Requena seems to be suggesting that the manufacture of maps should take more care not to give equal weight to all the sources or methods of gathering information. The less certain the information, the weaker would be the outline, showing the degree of reliability of the sources, formulating the information "by layers", in such a way that each layer responded to different levels of requirements and that the disappearance of one did not affect the whole. The map of Cruz Cano, on the contrary, gave the same validity to all traditions (within the margins of rigor established by the historical criticism of the Enlightenment), and did not explain the values or interests by which the information could be prioritized. Consequently, it might be reasonably precise and practical, but by leaving open many possibilities, it gave rise to too much uncertainty: it neither stabilized an object (colonial space), nor eliminated a conflict (disputes with Portugal), nor did it set a trend; that is to say, it did not permit the identification of a line of progress in the management of the colonial territory 13 .
Depicting lands as achievement: maps as monuments.
The division of America into kingdoms favoured ways of approaching territory that created affinities within administrative spaces, but also led to clashes with other Viceroyalties. Nevertheless, the general cartographic representation of these spaces was not carried out at the same time, which meant that such representations were not a collective answer to the needs of the court in Madrid. Let us consider, for example, New Granada, whose first modern small-scale general map arrived in 1790, after being comissioned by the Viceroy Jose Ezpeleta (1740-1823 In fact, as we see, the administrative reforms of the colonies undertaken by the cartography. This does not mean that it was unnecessary to make modifications to them, only that whatever went into them could no longer be moved. For this reason, time and caution are required when filling in a map. Thus, in Bauzá's map of Patagonia (1798) (fig 4) 35 the interruptions of the coastline were evidence of a lack of certain knowledge and, in the same way, all the information about the area considered doubtful or inadmissible also disappears, e.g. the communication routes that Cruz Cano drew in Tierra del Fuego. We have before us, then, a map very different from those mentioned before. In contrast to the profound historicism and overload of data on the "intendencia" or regional maps, naval hydrographers created a style of mapmaking, following guidelines from the metropolis, which aimed for a radical level of stability. This stability was, of course, restricted almost exclusively to the principal aim of these maps, the outline of the coast.
We are talking here about a drift which affected all imperial powers in the same way, and which needs to be explained. There is nothing obvious about a process that had turned the memory of places, all that information compiled by Cruz Cano from the most varied documentary sources, into irrelevant information: extraneous curiosities, trivialities for scholars. Harley interprets this displacement, prompted by a scientific theory, as a landmark in the process of dehumanization of the landscape, concealed beneath the inability of hydrographic engineers to include the descriptions of peculiar and local features 36 . We respect this approach, but we are sure that there is something more to be said about the proliferation of empty space, the desire for silence imposed by imperial management. Indeed, at the end of the eighteenth century Spanish cartographic production was extraordinarily developed, at the same time as means were created to reunite dispersed historical material referring principally to the colonies 37 . Not all came into public view, but many were published or copied and interchanged at the request of other European countries. Suddenly maps acquired an enormous diplomatic value.
What was at stake were the limits of empire, and maps were no longer exclusively scientific, becoming documents in an international dialogue of markedly legal character. The very idea of an imperial limit is still strange. The old empires' strategies for structuring territory show to what extent the construction of imperial limits, in contrast with its empty spaces, has not been a constant 38 . The preoccupation with accurately drawing the coastal perimeter was the consequence of a deep conceptual transformation of ocean space that had been developing since the end of the seventeenth century. If the increase in marine traffic raised the problem of whether ocean space should be of a public nature, a common 39 ; the political and legal analysis of the insular condition opened by Great Britain encouraged new geostrategic balances 40. The proposal to establish contact with the enemy on the basis of regional economic criteria and not the balance of European powers lent political robustness to the trading enclaves, even giving preference to the islands, subject to limits of supply (Gillis, 2003) . And Great Britain had sufficient military arguments to guarantee commercial privileges for its colonies.
What comes later is easy to explain because the development of naval technology reduced distances and increased contacts between the different colonies and with the metropolis. Space was contracted, deterritorialized, and in few years European colonial policies changed dramatically. The main strategic option was no longer the search for a point in the coast from which to reach interior 41 . Now the goal was on the coast itself, the main area of claims for jurisdictional rights, even when there were no claims of ownership 42 . But the spectacular development of trade gave constant cause for tension which, by opening bitter disputes on the legitimacy of certain commercial privileges, ended in the revision of criteria for the acceptance of claims of territorial possession.
At the end of the century, the Nootka crisis brought Spain and Great Britain to the brink of war 43 making it clear that the intricate jurisdictional network that maintained such a fragile equilibrium was sustainable only so long as the principle of property was not put into question. Great Britain, who until then had been guided by the classic criterion of discovery and symbolic possession, upheld occupation as a basic principle to justify these rights , a tailormade formula to counter the new British arguments for defining unconquered lands. In any case, the Spanish crown had to recognize that it needed to reformulate its policy of production of coastal space.
The treaty contemplated a moratorium on the creation of new settlements on the islands and coasts of southern America, but, according to a secret article, the pact would only be valid as long as no power settled in that area 47 . This situation forced the Spanish crown to keep constant watch, which made the possession of the coast and adjacent islands in some way a geostrategic disadvantage. Bodega y Quadra must have trembled at the possibility that a large part of what had been taken for a continental mass might turn out to be an archipelago 48 : hence his hurry, and that of Vancouver, each for opposite reasons, to examine the coast "at whatever risk" "from 47
degrees southwards with such precision that not one river or bay be overlooked as far as 41 degrees" 49 . This is also the reasoning behind the decision to leave settlements like San Blas, with a terrible climate and insufficient depth for large frigates, or to occupy enclaves strategic for trade, like Nootka, and to make the already existing ones to the north of California profitable. All these suggestions were directed towards the construction of a coastline independent from the territories of the interior. A line which, after being recognized and being translated into an international language (that is to say, mathematical), would permit the localization of a handful of enclaves suitable for marine trade. This strategy had the advantage that it assumed the commodification of the coastal strip, favoured by the new navigational facilities, but it would restrict occupation to the objectively occupiable enclaves. In addition, the coasts were marked as the limits of new space. In other words, their "inland", the densely-filled area on the map in relation with which the coastal strip established references and, so to speak, communicates, was located in the oceanic space.
Although the question of property, jurisdiction and sovereignty would be a lasting problem, maps achieved diplomatic status because, as they accumulated the different defeats on the same plan, new discoveries and successive reconnaisance were introduced directly and fully into international legislation 50 . At the same time, the territorial vacuum of the inland space turned the coasts into a legal watershed. And as it did so, the hydrographic charts identified as the only valid interlocutors in the international panorama their indirect author, the Spanish Crown, and those powers in a position to construct a territory on the ocean.
The enclaves, in short, gained value insofar as they came to form part of transoceanic trade, which meant that the policies of space production had to be projected onto the surface of the seas. In practice the oceans then ceased to belong to the public domain, and those "silences" that the hydrographers had depicted inlands of the continental masses were offset by these claims offshore. Thus, the "deterritorialization" implied by the purge of the Cruz map ran parallel to this "reterritorialization" of the Empire of the seas, which the hydrographers depicted in order to be able to take part in the new struggles of geopolitics.
Conclusion
The erudite commander Alexander Malaspina once defined the British empire as an amphibious body with a trading head and military body 51 . It is also possible to invent an ad hoc chimera for the Spanish empire, another monster whose body was half inland and half a shoreline empire. Cartography, indeed, echoed this duality, because what was valid at the level of biopolitics (the cross between geographic features and the tracks of human activity), was inadmissible on the scale of geopolitics (the cross between two types of document, scientific and diplomatic).. However, strategic considerations are not sufficient to justify the differences between the internal and external representations of the dominions of the empire. We also need to consider other arguments of an epistemic nature. The internal argument emphasized the location of resources and populations, and it was restricted to showing the existence of certain territorial bonds that, besides creating a hierarchy of places, also worked as lines of force that hinted at future mobilizations. The territory at that time was constructed like an organization in a permanent process of growth, which implied the rejection of earlier cartographic traditions. On the other hand, the oceanic representation of the empire rejected any idea of change, whatever the situation in the continental interiors, trying to turn the coasts into an ontologically stable object which would in consequence be manageable by a lasting international treaty.
Within this context the failure of Cruz Cano's map indicated the end of a world whose actors had lost political relevance, and which, together with the archaeological, anthropological or ethnographic knowledge to which they were intimately bound, had to migrate from the world of wonders and curiosities to that of treasures and thesauruses.
And just as maps became technical documents, objects too underwent a process of thesaurisation (according to the new conventions produced by the scientists) before being put away into the reduced space of the museums 52 . So, as their display cabinets filled, the maps emptied. Cartographic voids, nevertheless, behaved differently according to whether they referred to the inland or the shoreland empire. The "silences" that came from the interior preached the end of exceptionality and the beginning of the fact that the whole territory could be treated with the same yardstick: that is, by means of biopolitical tools (demographic tables, balances of payments, inventories of resources, medical geographies, botanical classifications) and management projects consistent with territorial evolution. On the contrary, their use in coastal maps Godlewska, 1989; 1999 4 Although the empire developed instruments for the monitoring of the geographic evolution of cities from the time of Felipe II, this information would generally be linked to the economic (and historical) management of the territory, and it would not receive an overall graphical form, partly because many of the maps sent by the colonies came from the natives and were, therefore, useless for the purpose of obtaining a consistent overall image. In the case of New Spain, 65% of the maps were commissioned from natives, because "images were the province of the The foundations of this idea had been laid by the Real Ordenanza de Intendentes (Royal Ordnance of Governors), particularly articles 57 and 58, which Revilla Gigedo, with insufficient men to carry out the work, solved by commissioning several officers in 1791 to "draw up plans of the places which they consider worthy of this operation, extending their reports and observations, in order to give some idea of their local situation and of the advantages they may yield or defects which should really be attended to" Revilla Gigedo to Carlos Urrutia, 30 October 1793, in Carlos Urrutia, "Noticia geográfica del Reino de Nueva España y estado de su población, agricultura, artes y comercio (1794) Ibid., [216] [217] This was the case of the town and encampment of San Juan de Sonora, the first capital of the province, which disappeared due to the incursions of the Seris. Ibid., 121. 27 Ibid., 187 28 The encampment at Basis, for example, had 594 people in 1778, but in the following year was down to only 289 (Ibid., 413).
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As was the case in Sonora about 1777, since they were obliged to perform other duties, such as assisting with supplies of provisions and mail in frontier towns (Ibid., 387) One of the more important collective contributions was without a doubt that of the Spanish trade delegation of Jalapa, the consulates and merchants of Mexico, Puebla and Veracruz, the ecclesiastical chapters of Durango and Oaxaca and some mercahnts and miners and neighbors of the missions and the border, who financed most of the campaign of Gálvez (Ibid., (149) (150) .
The authorities were confident of the economic commitment to stabilize the territories, and for that reason after the pacification of Sonora, Gálvez published a "Plan of a company of Shareholders to foment the activity of benefit of the rich Sinaloa and Sonora mines, and to restore the Pearl Fisheries in the Gulf of California" (1771), although the project did not have the awaited endorsement (Ibid., 200, 253) . 33 This form of participation was particularly encouraged due to its political impact. For that reason colonel Domingo Elizondo in 1770 informed Bucareli that the Seris and Suaquis of Pitic had constructed a corral and an irrigation ditch to irrigate their crops, and had a dam under construction. Navarro considers this information as the veritable announcement of the pacification of the zone (Ibid., 205) . Beneath these ideas of collective responsibility in the construction of the territory lies the internalization of biopolítics, the notion that "The more citizens there are in a Kingdom, the more the taxpayers and the greater the number of hands available for all the enterprises and resources to increase the general wealth " (Carlos Urrutia, "Noticia geográfica del Reino de Nueva España y estado de su población, agricultura, artes y comercio (1794)", in E. Florescano e I. Gil, Descripciones económicas generales de Nueva 
